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This paper focuses on the effects of the tax-deferred saving plan on total private 
saving. The model is an extension of the one in Ragan (1994) to incorporate 
production and varying factor prices. I take RRSPs as an example of the 
tax-deferred saving plan in the model. Two different tax systems are considered in 
analysis: the flat rate tax system and the progressive tax system. Under each tax 
system, the results in the case without RRSPs are compared with the results in the 
case with RRSPs. The simulated steady state results show that RRSPs increase the 
private saving rate under both flat rate and progressive tax system, which is 
different from the results in Ragan (1994). Also, RRSPs contribution accounts for 
a large portion of total saving due to the high tax rate. The optimal RRSPs 
contribution decreases as the tax distortion declines in the model. The sensitivity 
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This paper explores the effects of establishing tax-deferred saving plans as 
implemented in many OECD countries. A tax-deferred saving plan allows an 
individual to set aside a portion of income in a designated savings account and 
provides deferral of tax obligations. The two well known plans are Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRA) in the United States and Registered Retirement 
Savings Plans (RRSPs) in Canada. These plans were initially set up to promote 
saving for retirement by providing tax incentives (deferring taxes to retirement). 
The effects of these plans are still unclear and controversial, even though such 
plans have been established for half a century. Take the RRSP as an example, the 
average personal RRSPs contribution increased persistently from 1991 to 1997 
(see Akyeampong 2000), but for the same period Canadian personal saving rates 
dropped dramatically (Garner 2006). In the United States IRA was introduced in 
1974, the personal saving rate has decreased to near zero in 2005 since then 
(Garner 2006). These data pose an important question: are these tax-deferred 
saving plans the right measures to promote private saving? Previous studies on 
this question have generated mixed results. Although the main stream view on this 
topic appears to be that such plans are an effective means for promoting total 
private saving, one might as well examine the above question again. 
  The conventional view from the literature (e.g., Beach, Boadway and Bruce 
1988) says that such tax-deferred saving plans increase private saving by 
generating a substitution effect as such plans increase the rate of return to saving 
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(in terms of tax advantage) and reduce current consumption. However, Ragan 
(1994) argues that such a view ignored the fact that the total effect on private 
saving is compounded by the wealth effect, which has opposing effects on saving 
to as opposed the substitution effect. Specifically Ragan (1994) developed a small 
open economy model with exogenous endowments in lifecycle and shows that the 
RRSPs reduce the after-tax return to saving within a progressive taxation system 
and this substation effect reduces private saving. His conclusion is opposite to the 
conventional view. On the other hand, Venti and Wise (1994) and Carroll and 
Summers (1996) show that the RRSPs contributed to an increase in national 
saving.  
In the United States, studies of IRA generate similar results. Hubbard and 
Skinner (1995) show that IRA will substantially increase saving. In particular, 
Feldstein (1995) argues that the IRA will increase not only private saving but also 
public saving as the higher capital accumulation induced by IRA will increase 
profit of firms, which will in turn increase government tax revenue.  
In recent years, studies of tax-deferred saving plans are not only focused on 
the effect on saving. Fehr, Habermann and Kindermann (2006) indicate that such 
plans will have a positive impact on capital accumulation and wage growth in the 
long run. Moreover, the study of the newly introduced retirement plan (similar to 
CPF in Singapore where the contribution is tax deductable) in Germany by Fehr 
and Habermann (2008) shows that the new saving plan improves overall 
economic efficiency, but decreases the welfare of future generation significantly. 
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Milligan (2002) studies the effect of the tax rate on the participation in the RRSPs, 
the results show tax rates weakly affect households’ participation decisions. This 
result is somewhat consistent with the model of this paper. Later on we will see, 
under a flat rate taxation system, RRSPs is not desirable when the tax rate is low. 
The model used in this paper is an extension from the one in Ragan (1994) by 
incorporating production. This extension allows the interest rate and individual’s 
income to be endogenously derived from the production function. Thus, in this 
paper the interest rate and income are affected by aggregate saving, while those 
variables in the original model of Ragan are fixed. A varying interest rate will 
affect the after-tax rate of return to saving, which may result in a different 
conclusion from Ragan (1994). As this paper is extended from Ragan, to be 
consistent with that one, I will use RRSPs as an example of tax deferred saving 
plan throughout the whole paper. 
We study a standard two-period overlapping generation model without 
uncertainty. Two different tax systems are considered in the analysis: a flat rate tax 
system and a progressive tax system. Under each system the results between the 
two cases with and without RRSPs are compared. Due to the complexity of the 
continuous tax function that has no reduced form solution, more attention will be 
given to numerical simulations of steady state results by assuming plausible 
functional forms; and a sensitivity analysis will also be conducted. 
I also retain several assumptions used in Ragan (1994) to facilitate the 
analysis. The first assumption is that both RRSPs and non-RRSPs savings earn the 
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same real interest rate. It is reasonable if both types of savings are used as a 
capital input in production. The second one is that the amounts of the RRSPs 
contribution and non-RRSPs saving are non-negative. Thirdly, interest incomes 
both from RRSPs and non-RRSPs saving are taxed, while the income from the 
designated RRSPs account is only taxed upon withdrawal as in reality. Lastly, 
there is no population growth.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to see how the implementation of RRSPs 
affects total private saving or the saving rate under different tax systems. In 
general, numerical simulations in the model show that the saving rates will 
increase significantly after implementing RRSPs, resulting in a lower real interest 
rate due to over-saving. And the RRSPs contributions account for a very large 
portion of total saving due to high tax rates. The RRSPs contributions decrease 
when the overall tax rates decrease. Hence, when the tax rates are extremely low, 
the RRSPs contribution could be zero. However, for the plausible tax rates in 
Canada, the RRSPs contribution should always be positive according to the model. 
Moreover, all else being equal, the RRSPs contribution decreases when the tax 
rate becomes more sensitive to the change in taxable income.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the 
structure of the model will be set up for two cases with and without RRSPs, and 
the first order conditions will be presented. In section 3, the flat rate tax system is 
applied, steady state solutions are solved, and sensitivity analysis is discussed 
briefly. Section 4 is similar to its previous section beside that the progressive tax 
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system is applied. In section 5, I present the numerically simulated benchmark and 
sensitivity analysis of the flat rate tax system. And the numerical analysis of the 
progressive tax system is presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper 
and the appendix contains some necessary data. 
2. The Model 
The model is an extension of Ragan (1994) to incorporate production. There is an 
infinite number of periods with overlapping generations of agents who live for 
two periods. An agent has one unit of time in the first period of life, spends all 
time on working, and makes his decision on consumption and saving at the end of 
the first period. In the second period of life the agent retires and spends all income 
from saving on consumption. The mass of the working generation in period t is 
denoted by  . The size of each generation is assumed to be constant and 
normalized to one, i.e.   1 at all times. 
  The utility of an agent who is born at period t, ,, 
,, depends on own 
young-age consumption, ,, and own old-age consumption, 
,. It has the 




1    

,  11                                 1 
where β  0,1  is the discounting factor and 1/σ  is the elasticity of 
inter-temporal substitution. In a special case, when   1,  equation 1 
becomes a log utility function: ,, 
,  /0 ,  /0 
,, which will 
be used to simplify the analysis later. 
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  The production of a single final good is: 
5  67,   8799, 8 : 0, 0 ; < ; 1, 
where 7 is the aggregate physical capital at time t.  is the total number of 
workers at t and is always equal to one as defined above.  
  A tax deferral may be provided to the portion of income saved for retirement 
(RRSPs) by the government. We consider cases with or without RRSPs for better 
comparison. 
  Firms maximize profits in perfectly competitive markets. The first order 
conditions of firms maximizing profits determine factor prices. In an economy 
without RRSPs, factor prices are  
=  6>7,   81  <79, 
1  ?  6@7,   8<79. 
Individuals in perfectly competitive markets take the prices as given. Since one 
period in this model is about 30 years, it is reasonable to assume that capital 
depreciates fully within one period. 
 In the absence of RRSPs at period t an individual earns wage = in the first 
period of life. All income is taxable and tax payment A= is deducted from 
income, where A· is a tax function with taxable income as the input variable. At 
the end of the first period, the agent decides young-age consumption , and 
saving C for retirement. In the second period, the agent pays off taxes on interest 
income from saving and spends the disposable income as old-age 
consumption 




,  C  =  A=,                                                    2 
 
,  C1  ?  AC?,                                      3 
where C? is the taxable interest income. 
  Since each generation is of a unit mass, aggregate capital is equal to total 
private saving 
7  C. 
As can be seen above, an agent’s wage depends positively on saving, while the 
interest factor (the rental price of capital) is negatively related to saving. 
  Now consider the case in which RRSPs is implemented. In the first period, in 
addition to making the decision on young-age consumption and saving, the 
individual must decide how much to contribute to RRSPs plan. The contributions 
are deducted from taxable income in the first period, but in the second period the 
contributions and interest earned are added to taxable income when they are 
withdrawn. The agent budget constraints with RRSPs are as follows: 
,F  CF  G  =F  A=F  G,                                         4 

,F  CF  G1  ?F   AICF?F  G1  ?F J,                  5 
where G is the contribution to RRSPs plan, and the values of G and CF are  
non-negative. Superscript R denotes variables when the individual has access to a 
RRSP. 
  For the case with RRSPs, similarly, factor prices are given by: 
=F  81  <7F9, 
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1  ?F  8<7F9. 
The difference from the case without RRSPs is that now the total saving takes 
RRSP contribution G into account since G is actually another form of saving. 
Hence, the physical and labor market clears when 
  1, 
7F  CF  G. 
  In summary, in absence of RRSPs an agent maximizes equation (1) subject to 
constraints (2) and (3). In the case with RRSPs, the agent maximizes equation (1) 
(, and 
, are replaced by ,F  and 
,F ) subject to constraints (4), (5) and 
G L 0. 
  In the remaining of this section, I will try to solve for first order conditions for 
the problem with and without RRSPs regardless of the structure of tax system. 
  Substitute equations (2) and (3) into individual’s utility function, and 
differentiate it with respect to  C . The first order condition with respect to 
C without RRSPs is: 
,, 
,M,, 
,  1  ?  ANOM?                                   6 
where the second-period taxable income is denoted by OM  C? . The 
subscripts on  denote the partial derivate of  with respect to either young-age 
or old-age consumption. Also, ANOM denotes the tax rate when the taxable 
income is given by OM. The left hand side of the optimal condition is the marginal 
rate of substitution, and the right hand side represents the after-tax interest factor. 
The term involving the tax rate on the right hand side also reflects the fact that 
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interest income from non-RRSPs is taxed and taxes distort the decision of saving. 
Equation (6) also states that the saving is optimal when the marginal loss of saving 
is equal to the marginal benefit of saving. 
  For the case with RRSPs, the problem becomes more complicated as now there 
are two control variables. To solve for the general optimal conditions for the 
problem with RRSPs, I first construct the Lagrange equation as follows: 
   C, G , Q,, QM,, QR,, QS,
 ,F , 
,F   Q,T=F  AOF,F  CF  GU 
 QM,VCF  G1  ?F   AIOMFJ  
,F W                                    
QR,C  QS,G                                                                                          
where OF  =F  G and OMF  CF?F  G1  ?F  are first and the second 
period taxable income, respectively; Q is the lagrangian multiplier. Differentiate 
with respect to CF and  G. Optimal conditions can be summarized as follows: 
   CF: ,F , 
,F 
 M,F , 
,F 1  ?F  ANOMF?F   QR,                           7 
   G:  ,F , 
,F I1  ANOFJ 
 M,F , 
,F I1  ?F   ANOMF1  ?F J  QS,                          8 
The slackness conditions:  QR,C  0  and  QS,G  0 . In addition, 
C, G , QR,, QS, L 0. 
  The first order condition with respect to CF, given by equation (7), takes the 
same form as the one in the problem without RRSPs. The left hand side of the 
equation is the marginal utility loss of non-RRSPs saving, while the right hand 
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side is the marginal utility gain from non-RRSPs saving. Equation (8) represents 
the first order condition with respect to RRSPs contribution. Again left hand side 
is the total marginal loss, consisting of two terms. The first term is the utility loss 
from reduced consumption, while the second term represents the tax benefit from 
RRSPs contribution since reduced taxable income will lower the first period tax 
rate. On the right hand side of equation (8), the marginal benefit of RRSPs saving 
is represented by the product of marginal utility of old-age consumption and the 
after-tax rate of return on RRSPs contribution. As we can see, the rate of returns 
on non-RRSPs and RRSPs saving are different. This difference simply reflects the 
fact both the RRSPs contribution and the interest income from RRSPs are taxed 
upon withdrawal. In general, equation (7) reflects the agent’s desire to smooth 
consumption by using RRSPs saving. And equation (8) shows that the RRSPs 
contribution is mainly used to maximize the benefit from changing tax rates and 
taxable income across periods (i.e. minimizing tax payments). 
3. Flat-rate income taxes 
In this section, I examine the model under the flat-rate taxes system. The primary 
purpose is to see how tax-deferred plans affect private savings in such a simplified 
economy. The results can also be used to compare with those with a progressive 
taxes system to see the effects of different tax systems on tax-deferred saving 
plans. With such a tax system, there is no effect of RRSPs contribution on the tax 
rates at the margin. Therefore, the tax benefit from RRSPs contribution is only due 
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to the changes in taxable income across periods. The tax function satisfies the 
condition: ANO  A, where τ is a positive constant less than one, and O is the 
taxable income. 
3.1 Without RRSPs 




,   1  ?  A?                                        9 
The intuition behind this equation is that consumption is chosen so that the 
after-tax interest factor is equals to the marginal rate of substitution. In the above 
equation, the tax rate is explicitly involved on the right-hand side, and therefore it 
affects the first order condition. A higher tax rate will cause a lower after-tax 
interest factor. Because the agent earns no income in his or her old period, the 
higher tax payment from the interest income of savings results in lower disposable 
personal income. From the perspective of the marginal rate of substitution, it has 
to decrease as the tax rate increases. In other words, old-age consumption 
becomes more valuable at the margin. Thus, the agent will rise his or her saving.  
  Substitute the utility function into the above equation, I obtain: 
IC1  ?  AC?J=  A=  C   1  ?  A?. 
Rearrange the terms, C can be expressed as a function of the wage, the tax rate 
and the after-tax interest rate: 
C  [
/=1  A[  [/ .                                                 10 
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where I denote the after-tax interest factor by [  1  ?  A?. As defined 
in the previous section, =  81  <79 and ?  8<79  1  . In 
equilibrium, 7  C. Thus, in equation (10), the only two variables involved 
are C and C. 
  At steady state, savings remain constant, i.e. C  C\  7]  7. Consequently, 
=  =] , 1  ?  1  ?\  and [  [^  since these variables are all 
determined by C. Therefore, 
 C\  [^/=]1  A[^  [^/ .                                                 11 
The steady state saving C\ without RRSPs can be solved from the above equation. 
  After solving the steady state savings, what concerns us next is the relationship 
between certain parameters and the steady state savings, i.e., the sensitivity of 
steady state savings with respect to changes in parameters such like α, β and τ. 
One may examine this relationship by differentiating equation (11) with respect to 
those parameters. However, due to the complexity of derivative, it is impractical 
to analyze them even after rearranging the terms. Therefore, for simplicity, I 
consider the case when utility is represented by a log function, i.e.,   1. 
  When   1, from equation (10), C is given by: 
C  =1  A1                                                         12_ 
Then at steady state, the savings under log utility function is given by: 
C\  =]1  A1                                                           12` 
Compared with equation (10), we can see that the after-tax interest rate R is 
irrelevant here due the unitary elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. R has been 
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cancelled out since on the left hand side of equation 
, also includes R.  
  Differentiate s\ with respect to tax rate τ in above equation, I have: 
ds\
dτ 1  β  β1  α1  r\1  τ
ds\
dτ  βw], 




1  β  β1  α1  r\1  τ 
which is a negative term for empirically estimated value of the parameters. Thus, 
we can expect at steady state private saving decreases as the tax rate increases. 
The result is consistent with the analysis in the above part. As the tax rate 
increases, the after tax interest rate decreases. In the first period, an agent tends to 
save less to keep the relative consumption level between young-age and old-age at 
the desired level such that their marginal rate of substitution is equal to the 
decreased after-tax return to savings. 
  Substituting the wage and interest equations into equation (12), we have: 
s\  dA1  αβ1  τ1  β f
/g
. 





1  αM dln
A1  αβ1  τ
1  β  1f. 
According to this, the above is positive. However, in fact, it is ambiguous whether 
the saving will be greater for a greater capital share in production in the steady 
state since the factor prices increase first and then decrease as the value of α 
increases. In fact, when σ=2 (utility function is no longer a log function), as we 
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will see in section 5, saving decreases as α increases. The reason is that in the case 
of σ=2 the effects of α on the after-tax interest rate are considered, while the 
after-tax interest rate is cancelled out in the case of log utility. Simply speaking, 
other things being equal, when σ=2, higher value of α will generate higher interest 
rates. As a result, the agent can earn more interest income in the second period 
even if he or she saves less. On the other hand, a larger α also results in higher 
wage income. In this situation, the agent can increase young-age consumption 
without hurting old-age consumption and still earn more income even with lower 
savings. 
  The derivative with respect to the discount factor  is as follows: 
ds\
d 
w] 1  τ  s\
1  β  β1  τ1  r1  α : 0. 
It is always positive since the numerator is just the young-age consumption that is 
always positive. The intuition is straightforward, as the discount factor β increases, 
the old-age consumption becomes more valuable to individuals, which makes 
individual save more for the old-age consumption. 
3.2.1 With RRSPs and positive non-RRSPs saving 
For the case with RRSPs, let’s first consider the case that the RRSPs contribution 
and non-RRSPs saving are both positive, i.e., QR,  QS,  0 in optimal equation 
(7) and (8). The other two cases (QR, h 0, QS,  0 and QR,  0, QS, h 0 will 
also be covered later. 
  With QR  QS  0, and under the flat rate tax system,  ANOMF  A. The first 
order conditions, given by equation (7) and (8) become: 
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 ,F , 
,F   M,F , 
,F 1  ?F  A?F  
,F , 
,F 1  A  M,F , 
,F I1  ?F   A1  ?F J. 
As we can see, in the first order condition with respect to G, both sides of the 
equation involve the term 1  A. Dividing both sides by the term, the tax rate 
distortion can be removed from the first order condition. The above equation 
becomes: 
,F , 
,F   M,F , 
,F 1  ?F .                                13 
The cancelation is due to the fact the RRSPs contribution has no influence on the 
tax rate in this case. This is, any tax-deferred income in the first period will be 
taxed at the same rate in the second period. Note that in the case with the 
progressive tax system implemented, the tax rate changes as the RRSPs 
contribution changes, and therefore the tax distortion will remain in the first order 
condition.  
  The first order condition with respect to C, listed above, is the same as that 
without RRSPs and is given by Equation (9. Therefore, we have two optimal 
conditions and two variables. Mathematically, the solution can be solved from 
above optimal conditions. However, the problem can be simplified further by 
combining the two first order conditions. From equation (9) and (13), I obtain: 
?F  0. 
The real interest rate 1  ?F  is one. Thus, both conditions become: 
,F , 
,F   M,F , 
,F ,                                  14 
which means in equilibrium, the marginal benefit from the RRSPs contribution 
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equals the marginal benefit from Non-RRSPs saving. Moreover, the real interest 
factor equals one. The reason behind this is as follows. From the two first order 
conditions in equations (9) and (13), if ?F is greater than zero, the after-tax 
return of the RRSPs contribution is always great than that of Non-RRSPs saving, 
i.e. 1  ?F : 1  ?F  A?F . Therefore, the agent will keep contributing to 
the RRSPs account until the real interest factor reaches one, i.e. ?F  0. On the 
other hand, if ?F  is less than zero, the above equality will reverse the order. The 
agent will reduce RRSPs saving and consequently raise the interest rate.  
  When the real interest factor equals one, we can derive the total saving from the 
following equation: 
 1  ?F  8<7F 9  1. 
Rearranging terms, I obtain: 
7F  CF  G  8< 9                                          15 
which says that total steady state saving is constant, dependent on the total factor 
productivity and the share parameter (8 and α), and independent of parameters 
such as tax rate τ, discounting factor β and elasticity of inter-temporal 
consumption 1/σ. From equation (15) it is easy to conclude that total saving is 
positively related to 8 and α. In this model, parameter 8 can be considered as a 
scalar, all variables increase in 8. For the parameter α, a higher value will result 
in a higher value of the interest factor for fixed total saving, so the agent need to 
save more in order to reduce the interest factor to one.  
  Note that for this special case, as the interest factor is always equal to one and 
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the tax rate is constant, at steady state the total taxable income will also be 
constant and given by the steady state wage income =]  (=]  G\ in the first period, 
G\ in the second period ). Consequently, the total tax payment is also constant and 
given by A=. As mention at the end of section two, the agent uses the RRSPs 
contribution to maximize the tax benefit. Now it is accomplished by reducing the 
interest factor to one. Consequently, the life time taxable income is kept at lowest 
possible level that is equal to the wage income =. Consequently, tax payment is 
also at its lowest level A=. 
  As we have worked out the total saving, next let’s focus on the components of 
the total saving. From equation (9) and (15) CF and G can be solved: 
  G  8<
91  ?F  A?F  /  /=F1  AA  A/  
  CF  8< 9  G 
At steady state, all the variables are constant, i.e.   CF  C\F and G  G\ . The 
solutions can be solved numerically. As can be seen from above solutions, 
although parameters like the tax rate have no influence on total saving, they do 
affect the value of RRSPs and non-RRSPs savings. We will see the specific 
relationship between steady state solutions and the parameters in the numerical 
simulations in section 5. 
  For the case that G  0 QS, h 0, although it does happen in real world, it is 
only possible in this model when the tax rate τ is extremely small. With an 
extreme small tax rate, the tax benefit from RRSPs contribution will be relatively 
small in second period due to the existence of discounting factor. Meanwhile 
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contributing to much to RRSPs will reduce young-age consumption. Therefore, in 
such a situation it is possible that RRSPs saving is not desirable. The numerical 
simulated result will be shown in section 5. 
3.2.2 With RRSPs and zero non-RRSPs saving 
Basically, without the non-negative restraint on non-RRSPs saving, the optimal 
non-RRSPs saving could be negative (people borrow to make RRSPs 
contributions) as long as the return to the RRSPs contribution dominates the return 
to the non-RRSPs contribution, when the tax rate is flat, independent of income. 
However, with identical agents, when all workers want to borrow, there is no 
willing lender, unlike the small-open economy with perfect capital mobility from 
outside. In addition, the result of zero interest from the previous case is not 
reasonable in reality. So I impose a non-negative restraint on non-RRSPs saving. 
In fact, with the constraint on non-RRSPs, it is possible that agents choose only 
RRSPs contributions to maximize utility. In the end, the interest factor is possible 
to exceed one.  
  Therefore, in the case of zero non-RRSPs saving  QR, h  0, the optimal 
conditions given by equation (7) and (8) and slackness condition become: 
 ,F , 
,F   M,F , 
,F 1  ?F  A?F   QR 
 ,F , 
,F 1  A  M,F , 
,F I1  ?F   A i 1  ?F J 
C  0. 
From the above equations, in the optimal solutions, the marginal benefit from 
RRSPs contribution is greater than that from non-RRSPs saving, equivalently, the 
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interest return from the RRSPs contribution is greater than from non-RRSPs 
saving. Consequently, the interest factor in optimal solutions will be greater than 
zero. 
4. Progressive tax system 
In this section, a progressive tax system is considered. For a progressive tax 
system, the tax function satisfies the following conditions:  0 ; AjO ; 1 
and A"O : 0, i.e. the tax rate is greater than zero and less than one, and it 
increases in taxable income. Note that the taxes used here is continuous despite 
the fact that most countries use discrete progressive tax systems. For numerical 
purpose, I adopt a parameterized continuous tax function from Gouveia and 
Strauss (1994): AO  `O  `Ol  m/l, where y  refers to taxable income 
while b, d and ρ are positive constants. Then the tax rate function is given by: 
ANO  `  `mOl  1/l.                                            16 
In the above function, parameter b is a scalar that represents the maximum tax rate. 
The overall tax rates increase as ` increases. For the parameter ρ, a higher value 
results in a higher tax rate when taxable income is high but a lower tax rate when 
taxable income is relatively low. That is, the curve becomes much steeper. The 
parameter d is similar to the concept of curvature in Mathematics. A higher value 
of d will cause the tax rate curve to bend more sharply. Accordingly, the tax rate 
will be more sensitive to a change in taxable income. 
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4.1 Without RRSPs 
The optimal condition is given by equation (6) absent RRSPs: 
,, 
,M,, 
,  1  ?  ANOM? 
With a progressive tax system, the tax rate in the above condition varies with 
taxable income. Therefore, as the saving changes, the above optimal equation will 
change in a more complicated way as compared to the equation in section 3.1. 
Let’s see how saving decision affects the above equation. As total saving C 
increases, the real interest factor 1  ? decreases. As a result, the second 
period taxable income OM  sn?  increases (decreases) when sn  is small 
(large). Consequently, the right hand side of the equation will decrease as a result 
of higher tax rate and lower interest factor. However, on the left hand side, or the 
marginal rate of substitution, always increases since young-age consumption 
becomes more and more valuable as saving increases. Thus, the optimal equation 
will finally reach a balance.  
  Substituting the utility function and the tax function into the above optimal 
condition gives: 

,,  1  ?  T`  `mOMl  1/lU?.                    17 
Substituting 
,  and ,  into above equation and then rearranging the 
equation, C can be written as follows: 
C  AOM  [
=  A=
1  ?  [
.                                      18 
where [  1  ?  ANOM? is the after-tax interest rate, AOM  `O 
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`OMl  m/l the tax payment in the second period, ANOM  `  `mOMl 
1op the tax rate in second period, and OM  C? the taxable income in the 
second period. At steady state, the saving can be solved from equation (18) with 
all variables replaced by the steady state variables. 
  Similar to the solutions under the flat rate tax system, here I explore the 
sensitive of steady state saving to changes in parameters. In what follows I will 
analyze the relationship by focusing on the first order condition given by equation 
(17). The analysis is consistent with the sensitivity analysis that will be given in 
section 5 and 6. 
  However, the effect of a change in β in steady state can be analyzed in equation 
(17). Assume initially at steady state the equation holds. With an increment in β, 
the value of the left hand side decreases. To rebalance the equation, the agent need 
to increase saving in order to increase old-age consumption and decrease 
young-age consumption. Meanwhile, the rising saving will reduce the right hand 
side of the equation. Thus, intuitively saving increases in the value of β. The effect 
of α is also analogous to that under the flat rate tax system. The agent reduces 
saving when the value of α increase as a result of higher wage and interest rates. 
  It is also worthwhile analyzing how parameters of the tax function affect the 
steady state saving. Generally speaking, an increment in any one of the parameters 
of the tax function will increase the tax rate for fixed taxable income. Thus, the 
effects would be similar to that of the tax rate under the flat rate system. As the tax 
rate rises, the after-tax wage income decreases. Meanwhile, in equation (17), all 
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else equal, a higher tax rate causes the right hand side to drop. To rebalance the 
equation, the agent will increase young-age consumption that has been dampened 
by a higher tax rate. Combining all together, we can conclude that the steady state 
saving is negatively related to the parameters of tax function. 
  The effect of the reciprocal of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, σ, is 
relatively straightforward. In equation (17), as the value of σ increases, for a 
sufficiently small value of β, the value of 
,/, will increase, which means 
the agent is going to smooth consumption across periods. Hence, the agent will be 
likely to increase first period savings.  
4.2.1 With RRSPs and positive non-RRSPs saving 
In this case, optimal conditions are given by equation (7), (8) and the 
corresponding slackness condition. And the tax rate function is given in equation 
(16). The taxable incomes are the same as defined in section 3. 
  For the same reason as in previous section, let us only consider the case where 
the Lagrange multiplier features  QR,  0  and   QS,  0 . Then the first order 
conditions given by equation (7) and (8), become: 
,F , 
,F   M,F , 
,F 1  ?F  ANOMF?F  
                      ,F , 
,F I1  ANOFJ 
  M,F , 
,F I1  ?F   ANOMF1  ?F J             19 
For the second equation, or the first order condition with respect to G, the left 
hand side of the equation represents the marginal loss in utility of RRSPs 
contribution, while the right hand side represents the marginal gain. The story 
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behind the above equation is as follows. Suppose that an increase in the RRSPs 
contribution by one unit comes solely out of non-RRSPs saving. After 
contributing to RRSPs, the tax rate increases to ANOF  and saving in tax 
payment is ANOF, the actual loss in young-age consumption is 1  ANOF. One 
period later, the one unit of saving and interest return are both taxed upon 
withdrawal. The optimal value of the RRSPs contribution is such that it equates 
the marginal loss to the marginal gain in the above equation. However, the actual 
mechanism behind this equation could be much more complicated as the RRSPs 
contribution does not only come from consumption. 
  One more thing need to be noticed is that in equation (19) the tax distortion is 
not cancelled out, which is different from the case under flat rate tax system. As 
the RRSPs contribution increases, the first-period tax rate decreases. The agent 
benefits from the reduced tax rate, but suffers from the consequently increased tax 
rate in the second period of life. Thus, the RRSPs contribution is used to balance 
the benefit and the loss from taxes. It reflects the desire of the individual to 
minimize life-time taxes. The optimal value of the RRSPs contribution does not 
only depend on individual’s utility function, but also depend on the structure of 
the tax system and pre-tax wage income. This observation can be further seen in 
an equation that is derived by replacing the marginal rate of substitution in 
equation (19) by that in equation (7): 
ANOMF  A
NOF1  ?F 1  ANOF?F                                               20 
which is an equation that does not involve the utility function. On the other hand, 
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in equation (7), we see that the non-RRSPs saving allows the individual to smooth 
consumption across periods. In other words, as mentioned in section 2, the two 
types of savings have different usage in the model. The agent uses the RRSPs 
contribution to minimize the life-time taxes, and then chooses non-RRSPs saving 
to smooth consumption. The result is the same as that in Ragan (1994), but the 
value of the RRSPs contribution is going to be much greater than non-RRSPs 
saving. 




\F  1  ?\
F  ANO^MF?\F 
     ANO^MF  A
NO^F1  ?\F1  ANO^F?\F  
where ANO  `  `mOl  1/l , \
F  C\F1  ?\F  AO^MF ,  \F  =]F 
AO^F  C\F , AO  `O  `Ol  m/l , O^F  =]F  G\  and O^MF  C\F?\F 
G\1  ?\F. Again, it will be solved numerically in the next section. Then, the 
effect of implementing the RRSPs plan can be observed by comparing the 
numerical results of the problem with and without RRSPs. 
  The sensitivity of steady state results to changes in parameters, such as α, β and 
σ, is very similar to the case under the flat rate tax system. However, the 
sensitivity with respect to the tax function parameter is quite different and 
complicated since the tax distortion exists in this case and plays an important role 
in determining the RRSPs contribution. The specific relationship between 
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parameters and the total saving will be analyzed numerically in the next section 
due to the complexity of tax function. 
  For the case QS, h 0, i.e., the optimal RRSPs contribution is zero, as discussed 
under flat rate tax system, it is possible when the tax rates are extremely small. 
Therefore, under progressive tax system, in order to have the optimal zero RRSPs 
contribution, one must reduce the tax function parameters to very small value, 
which will have infinite possible values for the parameters since there are three 
parameters in the tax rate function. 
4.2.2 With RRSPs and zero non-RRSPs saving 
Here I consider the case QR, h 0. Therefore, sn  0. The first order equations (7) 
and (8) become: 
 ,F , 
,F   M,F , 
,F 1  ?F  ANOMF?F   QR  
,F , 
,F I1  ANOFJ  M,F , 
,F I1  ?F   ANOMF1  ?F J 
where all variables and function involved are as defined above. In the above 
equations, QR is non-negative, we expect that the marginal loss of non-RRSPs 
saving is greater than the marginal benefit. 
5. Numerical example of flat taxation 
As my primary purpose is to examine the effects of implementing RRSPs on 
saving rate and various related variables at steady state, it is necessary to solve for 
the steady state problems numerically. Specific values of the parameters will be 
assigned. This section is organized as follows. A result with positive non-RRSPs 
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saving will be simulated first. And this result will be considered as the benchmark 
in sensitivity analysis later. Then, I will briefly mention the case with zero RRSPs 
contribution, which will be followed by the case with zero non-RRSPs saving. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis based on the benchmark will be conducted. For 
comparison, the initial state results with the same setting of parameters and initial 
capital 7q  10 are attached in appendix. Note that with calibrated numbers, the 
numerical results are unique and stable. 
5.1 The case with positive non-RRSPs saving 
As mention above, this case will be considered as benchmark in sensitivity 
analysis. For this benchmark numerical example, I set 8=40, α=0.3, β=0.6, 
τ=0.35 and   2. In this paper, 8 is just a scalar, and the real value does not 
really matter. For the value of α, based on the study of Jones (2003) it falls in the 
range from 0.3 to 0.4 for most OECD countries from 1960 to 2000. I set the flat 
tax rate at 35%, which is near the OECD average tax rate according to the OECD 
data base. Finally, the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is set at 2, which is 
based on the estimation by Gruber (2006).  
  As the size of the constant population is normalized to one, at steady state the 
private income and saving represent the aggregate income and savings in the 
model. Therefore, the saving rate used here is defined as the ratio of total private 
savings to wage income.   
  The main results are shown in table 5.1. As we can see from the table, total 
saving 7]  increases significantly after implementing RRSPs. In the case with 
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RRSPs, due to the higher saving at steady state, the wage income (r] ) is also 
higher than that without RRSPs. Combining these two variables together, the 
saving rate K]/W]  with RRSPs is much greater than the saving rate without 
RRSPs, which indicate that in this model the RRSPs do promote savings and the 
original goal is achieved in theory. The large portion of the RRSPs contribution in 
total saving in the simulated results says that most savings are used for tax 
purpose. Notice that the real interest factor is one, as predicted by first order 
conditions, which makes no sense in reality. However, the initial state interest 
could be greater than one, as posted in appendix, with the same setting of 
parameters and a given initial capital 7q. The result is because at the initial state 
the optimal non-RRSPs saving is zero, as in section 3.2.2. 











 Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 16.56150329 1.194670613 
x^ ---- 33.61400457 
K] 16.56150329 34.80867518 
W]  64.99619874 81.22024210 
v]/w]  0.2548072597 0.4285714285 
c^x 25.68602589 29.74938378 
c^y 23.90261008 23.04377358 
y^ 64.99619874 47.60623753 
y^M 11.29401045 33.61400457 
T] 22.74866956 16.66218314 
T]M 3.952903657 11.76490160 
1  r\ 1.681943556 1 
Utility 1.535966464 1.540348456 
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  Under flat rate tax system, the RRSPs contribution has no influence on the tax 
rate, but it still serves as a means to minimize and smooth the tax payment, as we 
can see in the table, for the value of taxable income y^ and y^M and tax payment 
T] and T]M the gaps between two periods are much smaller for the case with 
RRSPs. 
  For the difference in consumption pattern between the cases with and without 
RRSPs, the higher value of first period consumption c^x with RRSPs is due to 
the higher income and the lower tax payment; and the lower value of second 
period consumption c^y with RRSPs is due to the lower interest rate on saving 
and the higher tax payment in the second period. Note that the gap between 
young-age consumption and old-age consumption is larger in the case with RRSPs 
than that without RRSPs. This may be because that only a small portion of total is 
used to smooth consumption across periods in the case with RRSPs (s\  is 
relatively small), whereas all savings are used to smooth consumption in the case 
without RRSPs. Lastly, the agent’s utility increases after implementing RRSPs 
since the young-age consumption increased significantly. 
  As mention at the end of section 3, when the flat tax rate is sufficiently small, 
the RRSPs contribution could be zero. The critical value of the flat tax rate, 
according to the setting of parameter above, is around 1.8145%, which is much 
smaller than the average tax rate in reality. 
5.2 A special case with zero non-RRSPs saving 
This section corresponds to section 3.2.2 where the model has a corner solution 
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that the optimal non-RRSPs saving is zero. The setting of parameters is the same 
as the previous section except the value of σ. As in the simulated results in 
previous section, the optimal non-RRSPs saving is positive when σ  2. In order 
to illustrate the case with zero non-RRSPs saving, I set σ  1. 
Table 5.2: Steady state results when A=40, α=0.3, β=0.6, τ=0.35 and σ=1. 
 Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 15.54444506 0 
x^ ---- 28.76350828 
K] 15.54444506 28.76350828 
W]  63.77208230 76.70268875 
v]/w]  0.2437500000 0.3750000000 
c^x 25.90740844 31.16046731 
c^y 23.20563584 21.36717758 
y^ 63.77208230 47.93918047 
y^M 11.78644736 32.87258090 
T] 22.32022880 16.77871316 
T]M 4.125256578 11.50540332 
1  r\ 1.758241759 1.142857143 
Utility 5.141166072 5.276263810 
  The simulated steady state results are shown in table 5.2 above. In the first 
period the agent saves only in terms of RRSPs contribution. The results are similar 
to the case with positive non-RRSPs saving except that the interest factor is 
greater than one which is a more reliable result. As discussed in section 3.2.2, the 
after-tax interest factor of RRSPs contribution is greater than that of non-RRSPs. 
By combining all cases together, we can conclude that the RRSPs promote savings 
under the flat rate tax system. 
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5.3 Sensitivity analysis  
First of all, I should make one point clear, this section, as well as section 6.3, is 
more like comparative statics. The sensitivity analysis of steady state results with 
respect to parameters σ, α, β and τ is conducted in this section. It is done by 
changing one parameter slightly while holding other parameters constant in the 
numerical benchmark example. The results are posted at the end of this section.  
Sensitivity with respect to σ  
σ is the reciprocal of elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. An agent with a 
higher value of σ has more incentives to smooth consumption across periods. 
Numerical results are posted in table 5.3, and analysis results are summarized in 
the table below. For the case without RRSPs, total saving K] increases in σ 
since the agent wants to reduce young-age consumption c^x and raise old-age 
consumptionc^y as σ increases. Consequently, wage income W]  and saving 
rate K]/W]  also increase. And with higher saving, the interest rate 1  r\ 
drops. First period taxable income y^ is the same as wage income for the case 
without RRSPs, thus, it increases in σ, while the second period taxable income 
y^M decreases as a result of decreasing interest rate. Finally, first period tax 
payment T] rises and second period tax payment T]M drops.  
  For the case with RRSPs, the total saving K], income W]  and the saving 
rate K]/W]  remain constant as σ changes. However, for the specific components 
of saving, non-RRSPs saving s\ increases in σ and RRSPs contribution x^ 
decreases since with higher value of σ the gap between marginal benefit of RRSPs 
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contribution and non-RRSPs saving widens according to equation (9) and (13). 
Alternatively, we can say that more and more money is used to smooth 
consumptions as σ increases. The remaining variable changes in the same ways as 
they do for the case without RRSPs.  
  In conclusion, the gap between the two saving rates, our primary concern, 
decreases in the value of σ. Thus, as σ increases, the effect of RRSPs on 
promoting saving weakens.  
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↑*  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
With 
RRSPs 
↑ ↓ − − − ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ − ↓ 
*: An upward arrow means that the variable is positively related to the parameter. A downward arrow means that 
the variable is negatively related to the parameter. A bar means the variable is constant. 
Sensitivity with respect to α  
An increasing α will have different effects on the results with and without RRSPs. 
The results are presented in table 5.4. For the case without RRSPs, as explained in 
section 3.1, the saving s\ and K]) decreases in α. As a result of higher α, interest 
rate 1  r\ and wage income W]  both increases regardless of reduced saving. 
Putting them all together, saving rate K]/W]  decreases as seen in the table. All 
remaining variables increase in α as a result of increasing interest rate and wage 
income.  
  For the case with RRSPs, the total saving K]) increases. The interest rate is 
constant as given by optimal condition. The wage income and saving rate both rise 
as a result of the increasing total saving. Both consumptions increase since wage 
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income increased significantly. The first period taxable income y^ and tax 
payment T] decrease due to the increased RRSPs contribution. On the other 
hand, because of the increased RRSPs contribution, y^M and T]M both increase.  
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↓  ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
With 
RRSPs 
↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ − ↑ 
Sensitivity with respect to β  
The effects of β on the results are simple. As the value of β increases, old-age 
consumption becomes relatively more important. Therefore, for the case without 
RRSPs, total saving K]) and old-age consumption c^y increase. As a result, 
income W]   and saving rate K]/W]   increase, while interest rate 1  r\ 
decreases. Second period taxable income and tax payment y^M and T]M decrease 
due to reduced interest rate.  
  For the case with RRSPs, again, total saving K], income W] , saving rate 
K]/W]  and interest rate 1  r\ remain constant, but old-age consumption c^y 
increases as expected. Non-RRSPs saving s\  increases and RRSPs 
contribution x^ decreases according to the results in section 3.2. As a results of 
lower RRSPs contribution and constant income, y^M  and T]M  both decrease. 
Generally, the steady state results are not very sensitive to change in β. 
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ 
With 
RRSPs 
↑ ↓ − − − ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ − ↑ 
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Sensitivity with respect to τ  
The results are presented in table 5.6. First, for the case without RRSPs, as the tax 
rate increase, both after-tax wage and after-tax interest rate decreases. The agent 
decreases saving K]) in order to keep young-age consumption relatively high. As 
a result, income W]  and saving rate K]/W]   decreases. With smaller income 
and saving, both c^x and c^y decrease, and interest factor 1  r\ increase. y^ 
and T] are decreasing since wage decreased. Even though saving decreased, y^M 
and T]M are increasing since the interest rate increased.  
  For the case with RRSPs, as usual, income W] , total saving K], saving rate 
K]/W]  and interest factor 1  r\ remain constant as tax rate τ increase. The 
RRSPs contribution x^ is increasing, which is consistent with the solution in 
section 3.2. The remaining variables move in the same wage as those without 
RRSPs. However, the reasons behind the movement are different. Consumptions 
drop since the after-tax wage decreased. And the decreases in y^ and T] are 
mainly due to the increase in RRSPs contribution x^. Finally, Notice that x^ is 
positively related to the tax rate. As discussed in the end of section 3.2, x could be 
zero when tax rate is sufficiently low. In this extreme situation, RRSPs plan may 
be not desirable. 
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↓  ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
With 
RRSPs 
↓ ↑ − − − ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ − ↓ 
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Table 5.3: sensitivity of steady state results to the change in σ when A=40, α=0.3, β=0.6 and τ=0.35. 
 
 
σ=1.9 σ=2 σ=3 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 16.49187807 0.6963626531 16.56150329 1.194670613 17.06140987 4.368607249 
x^ ---- 34.11231253 ---- 33.61400457 ------ 30.44006793 
K] 16.49187807 34.80867518 16.56150329 34.80867518 17.06140987 34.80867518 
W]  64.91410386 81.22024210 64.99619874 81.22024210 65.57865516 81.22024210 
v]/w]  0.2540569320 0.4285714285 0.2548072597 0.4285714285 0.2601671204 0.4285714285 
c^x 25.70228944 29.92379157 25.68602589 29.74938378 25.56471598 28.63850596 
c^y 23.85537196 22.86936579 23.90261008 23.04377358 24.23983311 24.15465140 
y^ 64.91410386 47.10792957 64.99619874 47.60623753 65.57865516 50.78017417 
y^M 11.32845214 34.11231253 11.29401045 33.61400457 11.04372806 30.44006793 
T] 64.91410386 16.48777535 22.74866956 16.66218314 22.95252931 17.77306096 
T]M 3.964958250 11.93930939 3.952903657 11.76490160 3.865304820 10.65402378 
1  r\ 1.686910981 1 1.681943556 1 1.647292817 1 
Utility 1.679588633 1.685753261 1.535966464 1.540348456 0.7987243752 0.7988761804 
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α=0.29 α=0.3 α=0.301 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 16.56786176 4.024716393 16.56150329 1.194670613 16.56036647 0.8909144538 
x^ ------ 27.54252305 ------ 33.61400457 ------ 34.26194351 
K] 16.56786176 31.56723944 16.56150329 34.80867518 16.56036647 35.15285796 
W]  64.10702367 77.28531036 64.99619874 81.22024210 65.08444713 81.63404556 
v]/w]  0.2584406639 0.4084507042 0.2548072597 0.4285714285 0.2544442981 0.4306151645 
c^x 25.10170363 28.30809536 25.68602589 29.74938378 25.74452416 29.90095188 
c^y 22.81871494 21.92735637 23.90261008 23.04377358 24.01325569 23.16117773 
y^ 64.10702367 49.74278731 64.99619874 47.60623753 65.08444713 47.37210205 
y^M 9.616697197 27.54252305 11.29401045 33.61400457 11.46598342 34.26194351 
T] 22.43745828 17.40997556 22.74866956 16.66218314 22.77955650 16.58023572 
T]M 3.365844019 9.639883068 3.952903657 11.76490160 4.013094197 11.99168023 
1  r\ 1.580442868 1 1.681943556 1 1.692374981 1 
Utility 1.533867860 1.537311336 1.535966464 1.540348456 1.536170589 1.540650830 
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β=0.59 β=0.6 β=0.61 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 16.40472990 0.8830581121 16.56150329 1.194670613 16.71621235 1.501456910 
x^ ------ 33.92561707 ------ 33.61400457 ------ 33.30721827 
K] 16.40472990 34.80867518 16.56150329 34.80867518 16.71621235 34.80867518 
W]  64.81100511 81.22024210 64.99619874 81.22024210 65.17775466 81.22024210 
v]/w]  0.2531164248 0.4285714285 0.2548072597 0.4285714285 0.2564711294 0.4285714285 
c^x 25.72242342 29.85844816 25.68602589 29.74938378 25.64932818 29.64200858 
c^y 23.79614974 22.93470921 23.90261008 23.04377358 24.00733455 23.15114879 
y^ 64.81100511 47.29462503 64.99619874 47.60623753 65.17775466 47.91302383 
y^M 11.37141514 33.92561707 11.29401045 33.61400457 11.21711108 33.30721827 
T] 22.68385179 16.55311876 22.74866956 16.66218314 22.81221413 16.76955834 
T]M 3.979995298 11.87396597 3.952903657 11.76490160 3.925988878 11.65752639 
1  r\ 1.693179053 1 1.681943556 1 1.671031861 1 
Utility 1.526329487 1.530783440 1.535966464 1.540348456 1.545603722 1.549915510 
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τ=0.34 τ=0.35 τ=0.36 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 16.99327479 1.248728107 16.56150329 1.194670613 16.13578658 1.143616313 
x^ ------ 33.55994708 ------ 33.61400457 ------ 33.66505887 
K] 16.99327479 34.80867518 16.56150329 34.80867518 16.13578658 34.80867518 
W]  65.49997821 81.22024210 64.99619874 81.22024210 64.49040044 81.22024210 
v]/w]  0.2594393961 0.4285714286 0.2548072597 0.4285714285 0.2502044718 0.4285714285 
c^x 26.23671083 30.20706660 25.68602589 29.74938378 25.13806970 29.29170096 
c^y 24.30485013 23.39829318 23.90261008 23.04377358 23.49767872 22.68925399 
y^ 65.49997821 47.66029502 64.99619874 47.60623753 64.49040044 47.55518323 
y^M 11.07814445 33.55994707 11.29401045 33.61400457 11.50295647 33.66505887 
T] 22.26999259 16.20450031 22.74866956 16.66218314 23.21654416 17.11986596 
T]M 3.766569112 11.41038200 3.952903657 11.76490160 4.141064330 12.11942119 
1  r\ 1.651913453 1 1.681943556 1 1.712884768 1 
Utility 1.537199036 1.541252267 1.535966464 1.540348456 1.534685261 1.539416401 
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6. Numerical example of progressive taxation 
6.1 The case with positive non-RRSPs saving 
Again, for this numerical benchmark here, I set 840, α0.3, β0.6, `0.35, 
m 0.22, ρ0.8, |  1 and   2 . The values of tax function parameters are 
generally set according to the estimates in Gouveia and Strauss (1994). In order to 
produce a nice and typical benchmark I made a small adjustment: the value of d is 
much larger than the one in original estimates. As explained in section 4, a higher 
value of m will result in a more bended tax rate curve. The adjustment may produce a 
wired tax structure, but it will not affect the analysis results. And according the setting 
of parameter, the marginal tax rates will be between 0.25 and 0.35, which is a 
reasonable range of tax rates. The simulated results are presented in table 6.1. And 
again, for comparison, I attach the initial state results with the same setting of 
parameters and the initial capital Kq  10. 
  As we can see in the above table, the results are very similar to the results under flat 
rate tax system. The total saving K], the wage W]  and saving rate K]/W]  with 
RRSPs are much greater than those without RRSPs at steady state. The increased 
savings reflects the agent’s desire to minimize and smooth lifetime tax payments. As a 
result, we can see that the gap between tax rates τ^ and τ^M with RRSPs is smaller 
than that without RRSPs. However, on the other hand, the gap between consumption 
c^x and c^y becomes large after implementing RRSPs. The reason behind this result 
is that, in the table RRSPs contribution is much greater than non-RRSPs saving. That 
is, only a small portion of total saving is used to smooth consumption. The result 
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regarding utility is the same as that in the case under flat rate tax system.  
Table 6.1: Steady state results when A=40, α=0.3, β=0.6, b=0.35, d=0.22, ρ=0.8 and σ=2. 
 Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 17.19656007 0.05256068073 
x^ ------- 35.52821617 
K] 17.19656007 35.58077685 
W]  65.73406739 81.75656930 
v]/w]  0.2616080330 0.4352038883 
c^x 27.46077673 31.82317432 
c^y 25.55521041 24.52577444 
y^ 65.73406739 46.22835313 
y^M 10.97518310 34.98596902 
τ^ 0.3459560667 0.3430948919 
τ^M 0.3052791784 0.3396420594 
T] 21.07673059 14.35261813 
T]M 2.616532756 10.51275526 
1  r\ 1.638219682 0.9847601093 
Utility 1.540105846 1.544112300 
  One interesting thing of the results is that the real interest rate 1  r\ with RRSPs 
is less than one, which means the real return from saving is negative. In this case, the 
“tax income” from non-RRSPs will be deducted from second period taxable income. 
The negative real interest rate is mainly due to high saving. This result seems 
unreasonable in real world. But the real interest factor could be greater than one in the 
case when a corner solution exists. This case is going to be discussed in next part, and 
also can be seen in the initial state results in appendix. 
6.2 A special case with zero non-RRSPs saving 
The results are posted in table 6.2 below. As discussed previously, in this case with 
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zero non-RRSPs saving, the marginal loss of non-RRSPs saving is greater than 
marginal benefit. And Due to the lower bound on non-RRSPs saving and the lower 
value of σ, the total saving here is smaller than that in previous case. As a result, the 
interest factor is much larger in this case. We actually have positive real return as seen 
in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Steady state results when A=40, α=0.3, β=0.6, b=0.35, d=0.22, ρ=0.8 and σ=1. 
 Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 16.11892679 0 
x^ ------ 28.44243929 
K] 16.11892679 28.44243929 
W]  64.47017783 76.44482367 
v]/w]  0.2500214414 0.3720649473 
c^x 27.71169324 33.04076619 
c^y 24.84931034 23.00354805 
y^ 64.47017783 48.00238438 
y^M 11.51114942 32.76206729 
τ^ 0.3458324893 0.3434715275 
τ^M 0.3075376891 0.3386329207 
T] 20.63955780 14.96161819 
T]M 2.780765868 9.758519244 
1  r\ 1.714138700 1.151872628 
Utility 5.249552462 5.379131219 
  As compared to the previous case with positive non-RRSPs saving, the total in the 
case with RRSPs is much smaller. As a result, the interest factor is greater than one, 
whereas it is less than one in the previous case where the non-RRSPs saving is 
positive. We can see that the saving rate and utility increase significantly after 
implementing RRSPs, which is the same as in the previous case. 
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6.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity with respect to σ, α and β  
The results are shown in table 6.3-5. Generally, the results of sensitivity analysis are 
almost the same as the results in section 5.2. However, in this section first and second 
period tax rates τ and τM are different are they are included in the analysis. 
Fortunately, the value of tax rates move in the same pattern as the taxable incomes 
since the tax rate function is monotonically increasing in taxable income.  
  The main difference is that, under progressive tax system, the total saving K] 
with RRSPs and real interest rate 1  r\ with RRSPs are no longer independent to σ 
and β, while under flat rate tax system they are constant as required by optimal 
condition. As we can see in table 6.3, the total saving with RRSPs increases in σ. It is 
mainly due to the increase in non-RRSPs saving s\. The non-RRSPs saving serves 
as a means to smooth the consumption across period. When the value of σ increases, 
the agent has more incentives to smooth consumption. Thus, s\  increases, 
consequently, total saving increases. In table 6.3, the total saving is positively related 
to the value of α. This sort of results is predictable, because with higher value of α, the 
agent will earn more wage income. The interesting observation in this table is that the 
non-RRSPs saving decreases in the value of α. The reason behind this is that the 
increased real interest rate raises the after-tax interest income which can be used to 
finance old-age consumption. Therefore, in the first period less saving is required to 
smooth consumption across period. In table 6.5, total saving increases in the value of 
discount factor β. As the value of the discount factor increases, old-age consumption 
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becomes more valuable to the agent. Thus, the agent increases to non-RRSPs saving 
to smooth consumption. As a result, the total saving increases. 
Sensitivity with respect to σ 
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M τ^ τ^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
With 
RRSPs 
↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Sensitivity with respect to α 
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M τ^ τ^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↓  ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
With 
RRSPs 
↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Sensitivity with respect to β 
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M τ^ τ^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ 
With 
RRSPs 
↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ 
 
Sensitivity with respect to b  
An increase in b will increase overall level of tax rate. Therefore, the analysis is the 
similar to that with respect to the flat tax rate τ^ under flat rate tax system in section 
5.2. However, in table 6.6, the tax rates in both first and second period 
τ^ and τ^Mincrease as b increases. It is because the overall level of tax rates increased 
as a result of higher value of b. Moreover, the total saving K] in the case with 
RRSPs increases in b due to the fact that RRSPs contribution x^ is also increasing 




 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M τ^ τ^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↓  ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
With 
RRSPs 
↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ 
 
Sensitivity with respect to d and ρ  
As discussed earlier, higher value of d causes the tax rate curve bended more sharply 
and overall taxes increase, and higher value of ρ causes the tax rate curve shift 
downward at low value of taxable income and shift upward at high value, meanwhile 
resulting in a more sharply bended tax rate curve. In general, tax rate becomes more 
sensitive to changes in taxable income. As the value of taxable income is high, the 
steady state results will respond to changes in d and ρ in the same way, therefore the 
results are analyzed together here.  
  In the case without RRSPs, the sensitivity analysis results are exactly the same as 
those with respect to the flat tax rate τ^ under flat rate tax system in section 5.2 
since higher values of d and ρ under progressive tax system have same effect as 
higher value of τ under flat rate tax system.  
  In the case with RRSPs, RRSPs contribution x^ decreases in b and ρ. The reason 
is that less x^ is required to minimize tax payment since tax payment becomes more 
sensitive to taxable income as the values of d and ρ increase. Consequently, total 




Sensitivity with respect to d 
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M τ^ τ^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↓  ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
With 
RRSPs 
↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
Sensitivity with respect to ρ 
 s\ x^ K] W]  v]/w]  c^x c^y y^ y^M τ^ τ^M T] T]M 1  r\ U 
Without 
RRSPs 
↓  ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
With 
RRSPs 
↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ 
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σ=1.99 σ=2 σ=3 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 17.18933876 0.005037759469 17.19656007 0.05256068073 17.73421490 3.240883309 
x^ ------ 35.56911626 ------- 35.52821617 ------ 32.80732748 
K] 17.18933876 35.57415402 17.19656007 35.58077685 17.73421490 36.04821079 
W]  65.72578510 81.75200368 65.73406739 81.75656930 66.34399526 82.07731588 
v]/w]  0.2615311287 0.4351471819 0.2616080330 0.4352038883 0.2673070084 0.4391982170 
c^x 27.46258106 31.84083036 27.46077673 31.82317432 27.32202390 30.63194115 
c^y 25.55053992 24.50834110 25.55521041 24.52577444 25.90077340 25.69733832 
y^ 65.72578510 46.18288742 65.73406739 46.22835313 66.34399526 49.26998840 
y^M 10.97885485 35.03153524 10.97518310 34.98596902 10.69892592 31.93510921 
τ^ 0.3459552758 0.3430847915 0.3459560667 0.3430948919 0.3460136526 0.3437211797 
τ^M 0.3052953120 0.3396612342 0.3052791784 0.3396420594 0.3040375178 0.3382173736 
T] 21.07386528 14.33701930 21.07673059 14.35261813 21.28775646 15.39716394 
T]M 2.617653694 10.52823190 2.616532756 10.51275526 2.532367423 9.478654201 
1  r\ 1.638701407 0.9848884385 1.638219682 0.9847601093 1.603292899 0.9758041175 
Utility 1.553640377 1.557788464 1.540105846 1.544112300 0.7988830076 0.7990128280 
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α=0.29 α=0.3 α=0.3001 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 17.24616525 2.534310846 17.19656007 0.05256068073 17.19606412 0.02586386172 
x^ ------ 30.37790542 ------- 35.52821617 ------ 35.58346471 
K] 17.24616525 32.91221627 17.19656007 35.58077685 17.19606412 35.60932857 
W]  64.85734668 78.22614113 65.73406739 81.75656930 65.74280722 81.79377957 
v]/w]  0.2659092012 0.4207316863 0.2616080330 0.4352038883 0.2615657111 0.4353549715 
c^x 26.83772059 30.40524993 27.46077673 31.82317432 27.46698891 31.83802168 
c^y 24.39547301 23.32272414 25.55521041 24.52577444 25.56698282 24.53826191 
y^ 64.85734668 47.84823571 65.73406739 46.22835313 65.74280722 46.21031486 
y^M 9.244863674 29.41721158 10.97518310 34.98596902 10.99284349 35.04530809 
τ^ 0.3458709694 0.3434401021 0.3459560667 0.3430948919 0.3459569011 0.3430908874 
τ^M 0.2964630354 0.3367915213 0.3052791784 0.3396420594 0.3053566909 0.3396670189 
T] 20.77346084 14.90867493 21.07673059 14.35261813 21.07975419 14.34642932 
T]M 2.095555910 8.628798289 2.616532756 10.51275526 2.621924790 10.53291004 
1  r\ 1.536053293 0.9708104180 1.638219682 0.9847601093 1.639265091 0.9848872011 
Utility 1.538144284 1.541384960 1.540105846 1.544112300 1.540124893 1.544139404 
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β=0.599 β=0.6 β=0.61 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 17.17987031 0.02227387993 17.19656007 0.05256068073 17.36227076 0.3527130624 
x^ ------ 35.55428120 ------- 35.52821617 ------ 35.27009213 
K] 17.17987031 35.57655508 17.19656007 35.58077685 17.36227076 35.62280519 
W]  65.71492183 81.75365898 65.73406739 81.75656930 65.92345931 81.78552880 
v]/w]  0.2614302784 0.4348409754 0.2616080330 0.4352038883 0.2633701408 0.4355636714 
c^x 27.46494444 31.83442698 27.46077673 31.82317432 27.41893497 31.71159950 
c^y 25.54441488 24.51466394 25.55521041 24.52577444 25.66217173 24.63589710 
y^ 65.71492183 46.19937778 65.73406739 46.22835313 65.92345931 46.51543667 
y^M 10.98366763 35.01500854 10.97518310 34.98596902 10.89064037 34.69822786 
τ^ 0.3459542380 0.3430884576 0.3459560667 0.3430948919 0.3459740874 0.3431581339 
τ^M 0.3053164449 0.3396542861 0.3052791784 0.3396420594 0.3049050580 0.3395196619 
T] 21.07010708 14.34267692 21.07673059 14.35261813 21.14225358 14.45112411 
T]M 2.619123063 10.52261848 2.616532756 10.51275526 2.590739400 10.41504382 
1  r\ 1.639333559 0.9848419090 1.638219682 0.9847601093 1.627258987 0.9839466805 
Utility 1.539140597 1.543153112 1.540105846 1.544112300 1.549758457 1.553705181 
 48 
 





b=0.34 b=0.35 b=0.36 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 17.61853950 0.08217992499 17.19656007 0.05256068073 16.78061507 0.02439459715 
x^ ------ 35.49175205 ------- 35.52821617 ------ 35.56363477 
K] 17.61853950 35.57393197 17.19656007 35.58077685 16.78061507 35.58802937 
W]  66.21387469 81.75185057 65.73406739 81.75656930 65.25298660 81.76156834 
v]/w]  0.2660853119 0.4351452808 0.2616080330 0.4352038883 0.2571624066 0.4352659824 
c^x 27.95953669 32.22479468 27.46077673 31.82317432 26.96462525 31.42158092 
c^y 25.89965852 24.83455611 25.55521041 24.52577444 25.20830918 24.21696408 
y^ 66.21387469 46.26009852 65.73406739 46.22835313 65.25298660 46.19793357 
y^M 10.75883537 34.95432747 10.97518310 34.98596902 11.18495061 35.01627754 
τ^ 0.3361157196 0.3332990181 0.3459560667 0.3430948919 0.3557928517 0.3528906548 
τ^M 0.2956169072 0.3299250336 0.3052791784 0.3396420594 0.3149340825 0.3493592433 
T] 20.63579850 13.95312392 21.07673059 14.35261813 21.50774628 14.75195805 
T]M 2.477716354 10.20195128 2.616532756 10.51275526 2.757256498 10.82370806 
1  r\ 1.610654213 0.9848927418 1.638219682 0.9847601093 1.666539967 0.9846196253 
Utility 1.541067700 1.544808110 1.540105846 1.544112300 1.539112699 1.543398719 
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d=0.215 d=0.22 d=0.23 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 17.22142570 0.02192071886 17.19656007 0.05256068073 17.15066631 0.1102242601 
x^ ------ 35.58314166 ------- 35.52821617 ------ 35.42484022 
K] 17.22142570 35.60506238 17.19656007 35.58077685 17.15066631 35.53506448 
W]  65.76256772 81.77330610 65.73406739 81.75656930 65.68138931 81.72504413 
v]/w]  0.2618727689 0.4354117997 0.2616080330 0.4352038883 0.2611191159 0.4348124233 
c^x 27.50290504 31.87248269 27.46077673 31.82317432 27.38166767 31.73045772 
c^y 25.59244437 24.55984213 25.55521041 24.52577444 25.48499233 24.46168428 
y^ 65.76256772 46.19016444 65.73406739 46.22835313 65.68138931 46.30020391 
y^M 10.96253190 35.02378189 10.97518310 34.98596902 10.99850055 34.91479465 
τ^ 0.3457747483 0.3427855331 0.3459560667 0.3430948919 0.3462865324 0.3436587596 
τ^M 0.3038209539 0.3392271381 0.3052791784 0.3396420594 0.3080012228 0.3404052170 
T] 21.03823698 14.29576103 21.07673059 14.35261813 21.14905533 14.45952193 
T]M 2.591513234 10.48586048 2.616532756 10.51275526 2.664174532 10.56333463 
1  r\ 1.636563551 0.9842898810 1.638219682 0.9847601093 1.641287070 0.9856466963 
Utility 1.540195785 1.544194849 1.540105846 1.544112300 1.539935947 1.543956384 
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ρ=0.79 ρ=0.80 ρ=0.81 
Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
s\ 17.21676036 0.03415548755 17.19656007 0.05256068073 17.17686723 0.07088848644 
x^ ------ 35.56586680 ------- 35.52821617 ------ 35.49078019 
K] 17.21676036 35.60002229 17.19656007 35.58077685 17.17686723 35.56166868 
W]  65.75722264 81.76983329 65.73406739 81.75656930 65.71147548 81.74339494 
v]/w]  0.2618231073 0.4353686544 0.2616080330 0.4352038883 0.2613982886 0.4350402709 
c^x 27.48329772 31.84818072 27.46077673 31.82317432 27.43869195 31.79850145 
c^y 25.57269947 24.54191824 25.55521041 24.52577444 25.53794454 24.50985739 
y^ 65.75722264 46.20396649 65.73406739 46.22835313 65.71147548 46.25261475 
y^M 10.96490649 35.01005877 10.97518310 34.98596902 10.98519370 34.96199506 
τ^ 0.3457503036 0.3427798527 0.3459560667 0.3430948919 0.3461523121 0.3433974023 
τ^M 0.3044260083 0.3392436989 0.3052791784 0.3396420594 0.3061261236 0.3400274794 
T] 21.05716456 14.32163028 21.07673059 14.35261813 21.09591630 14.38322481 
T]M 2.608967378 10.50229602 2.616532756 10.51275526 2.624116389 10.52302616 
1  r\ 1.636873968 0.9843874248 1.638219682 0.9847601093 1.639534180 0.9851304748 




In an overlapping generations model with production, the factor prices change as the 
aggregate saving changes. The optimal saving is achieved when marginal benefit and 
marginal cost reach a balance. In the case with RRSPs (a tax-deferred saving plan 
used in this paper), the agent utilizes RRSPs contribution to maximize the benefit 
from tax reduction, and uses non-RRSPs saving to smooth the consumptions across 
period. Due to the high prevailing tax rate, the tax distortion is usually large, which 
results in a large portion of RRSPs contribution in total private saving. As a result, 
saving rate increases after implementing RRSPs. 
  Under the flat rate tax system, tax rate is independent of taxable income. Therefore, 
it is independent of RRSPs contribution. RRSPs contribution only serves to minimize 
lifetime tax payment. There are two cases need to be considered. The first case is that 
when the optimal non-RRSPs saving is positive. The after-tax return on the RRSPs 
contribution and non-RRSPs saving are the same, and the real interest factor is 
reduced to one, which is an unreasonable result in reality. The second case is when a 
corner solution exists. The total private saving only consists of RRSPs saving, i.e., the 
non-RRSPs saving is zero. In optimal solution, the after-tax return on RRSPs 
contribution is greater than that on non-RRSPs saving, and the real interest factor is 
greater than one. According to the simulation in section 5, under flat rate tax system, 
saving rates in both cases increase after having RRSPs. Another finding is that the 
optimal RRSPs saving could be zero when the tax rate is extremely small. That is, the 
RRSP is undesirable when the benefit from tax reduction is extremely small. 
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  Under the progressive tax system, the tax rate changes with RRSPs contribution. 
RRSPs contribution maximizes benefit from tax reduction by changing both tax rate 
and taxable income. Again, there are two possible solutions with regard to non-RRSPs 
saving: positive non-RRSPs saving and zero non-RRSPs saving. The difference is that, 
in the case with zero non-RRSPs saving, which is optimal when σ=1, the marginal 
loss from non-RRSPs saving is greater than the marginal benefit. Furthermore, in the 
latter case, there may be a real interest factor that is greater than one. Generally, 
RRSPs promote savings under the progressive tax system. 
  The sensitivity analysis under progressive tax system says that higher value of σ 
results in higher saving rates in both cases with and without RRSPs. And the 
government can raise the private saving rate by increasing infrastructure investment 
which raises the capital share α in the case with RRSPs. Importantly, it also shows 
that the increased over all tax rates will suppress saving in the case without RRSPs, 
while stimulate saving in the case with RRSPs. The increased sensitivity of the tax 
rate with respect to the taxable income will restrain saving in the both cases with and 
without RRSPs. Especially, it reduces RRSPs contribution. 
  The results in this paper are based on the assumptions which simplify the model. 
One possible assumption that can be abandoned is constant population. One may also 
incorporate human capital in production. With population growth and human capital, 
labor will have more influence on production, which may reduce the saving even in 
the case with RRSPs in steady state. The results may be a little different from the 
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current results. However, in the current simple model, we can always conclude that 
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Initial state results when A=40, α=0.3, β=0.6, τ=0.35 and σ=2 given initial capital K0=10 
 Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
sq 13.81543631 0 
xq ---- 22.26108772 
K 13.81543631 22.26108772 
Wq 55.86734482 55.86734482 
v~/w 0.2472900109 0.3984633204 
cx,q 22.49833782 21.84406712 
cy, 21.98302797 19.78602334 
y 55.86734482 33.60625710 
yM 12.56552563 30.44003590 
T 19.55357069 11.76218998 
TM 4.397933970 10.65401256 
1  r 1.909527962 1.367410087 




















Initial state results when A=40, α=0.3, β=0.6, b=0.35, d=0.22, ρ=0.8 and σ=2 given initial 
capital K0=10. 
 Without RRSPs With RRSPs 
sq 14.19191096 0 
xq ------- 22.18054624 
K 14.19191096 22.18054624 
Wq 55.86734482 55.86734482 
v~/w 0.2540287355 0.3970216646 
cx,q 24.00685849 23.61493036 
cy, 23.53811910 21.44452254 
y 55.86734482 33.68679858 
yM 12.40269190 30.40695400 
τ 0.3448069846 0.3390707004 
τM 0.3109057466 0.3373831147 
T 17.66857537 10.07186822 
TM 3.056483764 8.962431463 
1  r 1.873926840 1.370883912 
Utility 1.532854670 1.529674736 
 
 
